Using a relation of partial causation which is a modification of Burks' causal implication, a definition of doing is given in terms of striving for, and a definition of knowing in terms of believing. A definition of ability to do is given in terms of striving for, and a definition of desiring is given in terms of striving for, believing, and ability to do. A logical notation with two primitive signs. This paper presents two systems of logical notation, each using just two typographic signs or shapes, namely, the left-and right-hand parentheses. The first system is easily shown adequate for Quine's Mathematical Logic (1940, 1958 Induction and recursion. Let R be primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA) with the rule A (0), t (a') -< a', A (t(a)) ->A (a) A (a) of induction on the PR predicate <, and the axiom 0 < a' added. Let S(S) be obtained by adding to PRA the axiom 0 < a' and the schema for introducing functions by ordinal recursion on < (by ordinal recursion on < when the auxiliary functions are PR). The rule (-<) is derivable in S, so that RC S (K. G6del). In fact, if A(a), t(a) are PR expressions, the rule (-<) is derivable in S'. Let E (/, a, b)(E'(/, a, b) ) be the usual defining equations for the enumeration t (O, b), t(l, b) Often one can find a simpler equivalent of a given quantificational formula. Thus, '(x)(3y)((Fyz Fyx) = Fux)' is equivalent to 'Fuz.' Yet the possibility of devising routine techniques for the simplification of quantificational formulae does not seem to have been ever investigated. The purpose of this paper is to initiate such an investigation.
We define 'simplicity' for certain canonical formulae, namely for prenex normal forms wherein what follows the prefix is a conjunctive or alternational normal form. A technique is then described for the simplification of canonical formulae analogous to the so-called cut-and-try method for the simplification of truth functions, and its power is illustrated in a variety of examples. The method is valuable, since it has the same kind of de facto effectiveness for comparatively simple formulae as does the corresponding method for truth functions.
As is the case for truth functions, a cut-and-try method is not adequate for the simplification of the more complex quantificational formulae. The next question of theoretical and practical interest then is: is it possible to have a general, theoretically effective simplification procedure for quantificational formulae, such as exists for truth functions? The answer is 'no.' In fact it can be easily shown that if we had such an effective simplification procedure for quantificational formulae, we should also possess a decision procedure for quantificational logic, which we know to be impossible. But effective simplification procedures may be devised for special classes of quantificational formulae. A mechanical procedure is described and shown to be effective for the simplification of formulae with at most one quantifier. The simplification even of such formulae is by no means always a trivial matter, and its theory appears to be susceptible of generalization for canonical formulae with only universal or only existential quantifiers, or with only monadic predicates. also forthcoming elsewhere), Anderson and the present writer developed a semantics for first degree entailments (ide), i.e., entailments between formulas involving only truth-functions (defined in terms of "or" and "not") and quantifiers. The key ideas were (i) the notion of a frame <P, FIp, I>, where P is a set of (intensional) propositions closed under negation and multiple disjunction, I is a domain of individuals, and FIp is the set of functions from I to P; and (ii) the semantic relation of cons (consequence), as obtaining between a set of propositions taken conjunctively, and a set taken disjunctively; and (iii) the notion of an atomic frame, i.e., a frame generated by a set of propositions X closed under negation, such that for any disjoint subclasses Y and Z of X, Y does not bear cons to Z. Consistency and completeness proofs were forthcoming for the /de fragment of the system EQ of entailment with quantifiers.
These semantics also extend to yield a definition of "valid" for first degree formulas (fdf), i.e., the set of formulas which contains all Ide and purely truth-functional formulas, and is closed under disjunction, negation, and quantification.
It was conjectured that the fdf fragment of EQ is consistent and complete, and problems concerning the effectiveness of the notion of validity for the quantifier-free fragment of fdf were raised.
The conjecture is correct. It also turns out that there is a decision procedure for validity (and hence for provability in EQ) of quantifier-free fdf.There is also the following curious version of the L6wenheim-Skolem theorem: if a set of fdf are simultaneously satisfiable, then they are so in a frame <P, FIp, I>, where P and I are at most de-numerable. We remark that the denumerability of P is essential: there are fdf not satisfiable in any frame with P finite, but satisfiable with P denumerable. Since, by F* W(fl) and (the correct half of) Satz 23.12, < n has ordinal < co, ,Wl*(fi) means that <-has ordinal < so too.
Lemma. If (i) and (iii), F1 A-> [P(x) -+ P(X)] (P is stable). For, by (iii),
Corollary. All V-provable arithmetic well-orderings have ordinal < co. Remarks. The theorem is best possible in the sense that there are HI orderings of ordinal co which can be proved to be well-orderings in Z*; e.g., trivially, the one given by Gandy [Bull. Acad. Pol. Sc., vol. 9 (1960), 571-575].
Naturally, the addition of axioms to Z* makes (TI) provable for some <, for which (TI) is not provable in Z* itself: it is only the least upper bound on the size of the ordinals of provable well-orderings which is unchanged. (Received November 3, xg6x.) G. KREISEL. Ordinals of ramified analysis. < is the ordering of Schfitte's book Beweistheorie (BT). As in BT, rP is ramified analysis of n levels; Z(a) first order classical arithmetic Z with (II) (cf. preceding abstract) applied to formulae P(x) of Z, for each b, b < a; Z+(a), the same, for each b, b -< a; PRD(a) is primitive recursive arithmetic (pra) with definition by quantifierfree transfinite recursion over each proper initial segment of {x: x < a}, as in abstract XXIV 322-323; PRP(a) is pra with proof by quantifier-free (TI) over {x : x < b}, for each b -< a, but no additional (function) constants; PRD+(a), PRP+(a) are defined analogously.
If Jal denotes the ordinal of {x: x < a}, 131 = co, 151 -= o; let en be defined by: leol = eo, Jen~+1 = rIe " For 3 < a, Z(a), PRD(a), PRP(a) If possible, one or more sessions for contributed papers will also be scheduled. It is hoped that younger logicians, including students, will be encouraged to attend, and The Organizing Committee hopes to find some funds to furnish partial support for a few of these.
A more detailed announcement will be sent in several months when further information is available.
